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INTRODUCTION

The use of sophisticated means to detect criminal behavior has deep
roots in both the methodology of law enforcement and the philosophy of
our courts. Illegal activity can now be observed from a plane, by a satellite,
or through a wall.' Some of these tools have civil rights activists and
judges wondering if with every new advent in technology, a bit of our right
to privacy will melt away. 2 The answer to whether this troubling proposition could become reality may lie in a police tool utilized since 300 B.C.:
the nose of a trained police dog.
A recent Supreme Court decision, People v. Caballes, has broad im4
plications for the application of the Fourth Amendment in coming years.
This decision has solidified a doctrine suggesting that the use of an extra
sensory device (or animal) that detects only the "presence or absence of
narcotics" cannot invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.5 This
article will explore the paths courts have taken leading up to the decision,
the soundness of the Caballes opinion itself, and the implications it has for
the future of law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SNIFF SEARCH BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND

To begin, the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af1. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001) (allowing the use of thermal
imaging device to detect heat through walls); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209
(1986) (allowing the detection of back yard marijuana farm from private plane); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) (allowing the use of aerial mapping
from 1,200 feet by EPA); United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing the use of GPS technology to trace drug dealer's path of travel).
2.
People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299, 305 (Cal. 1985) ("[Ain individual's expectation
of privacy is not defined solely by technological progress. We reject the Orwellian notion
that precious liberties derived from the Framers simply shrink as the government acquires
new means of infringing them."); Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus, Fourth Amendment
Forum, CHAMPION, June 2005, 48, at 50.

3.
Andrew Lindstad, Note, State v. De La Rosa: Creating a De Minimis Exception
to the Fourth Amendment, 49 S.D. L. REv. 313, 317 (2003-04).
4.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
5.
See id. at 409.
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firmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.6
Originally drafted to prevent the use of general warrants held by the
crown in colonial times, the underlying thrust of the Fourth Amendment has
7
always been to protect against arbitrary invasions by government officials.
Concerning the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has long held
that "no right is held more sacred" and thus should not be disturbed absent
"unquestionable authority of law." 8 This sacred right protects not simply
places, but people, wherever they maintain a reasonable "expectation of
privacy." 9 "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property."' 0 Meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in oneself occurs whenever that person is deprived of his or
her "freedom to walk away.""
B. SUPREME COURT: UNITED STATES V. PLACE

Discussion by the Supreme Court of narcotics detection dogs and their
relationship with the Fourth Amendment begins with its first impression,
United States v. Place.'2 In Place, officers seized luggage in order to conduct a K-9 sniff for narcotics.' 3 Citing Terry v. Ohio among other cases, the
Court first sought to determine whether a sniff was in fact a search, thereby
requiring probable cause.' 4 The court applied a subjective/objective test,
asking if the government intrusion (a sniff search) was unreasonable, and if
it invaded a legitimate expectation of privacy.' 5 Focusing on the lack of
physical intrusion into the luggage, the information revealed was consid-

6.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
7.
Lindstad, supra note 3, at 317; e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City, 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.").
8.
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
9.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
10.
United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
11.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
12.
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
13.
Id. at 699. After learning the address tags on Place's bags were fictional, and
his story of being previously searched false, officers seized his bags and subjected them to a
sniff test. A positive alert, followed by a search, revealed 1,125 grams of cocaine. Id. at
698-99.
14.
Id. at 706 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
15.
Id. at 706-07.
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ered limited, the means convenient and free of notable embarrassment.1 6
The sniff was said to disclose "only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item."' 17 In the court's view, because a sniff has such a limited
intrusion in application, and reveals so little about an item being scrutinized, "a canine sniff is sui generis" and unlike any other investigative
procedure. 18 In its explanation the court carefully limited its holding to the
facts of the case, leaving the door open for other courts to evaluate K-9
intrusion in different circumstances. 19
C. LOWER COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF PLACE

Immediately following the Place decision, courts began to differ in
their interpretation of it. Only four months passed before a Ninth Circuit
decision attempted (but failed) to add a requirement of articulable suspicion
before a sniff of luggage in an airport could take place.20 The primary divergence in courts however, was in attempting to discern whether a K-9
sniff could ever be a search. The Second Circuit held in United States v.
Thomas that, when used to create probable cause to enter a home, a sniff is
simply an enhancement of an officer's sensory perception, much like an
eyeglass. 2 1 Because this enhancement was used to detect information from
a dwelling, where the right to privacy is at its peak, it was held to violate
16.
Id. at 707. The court compared a sniff search to a typical search, which would
require the luggage to be opened in public, carrying the potential for embarrassment and
exposure of non-contraband items. Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. Sui generis literally translates in English as "of its own kind," indicating that
a canine sniff is completely unique, of its own class, or peculiar. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY
1475 (8th ed. 2004). Here the court likely classified a sniff search as such to demonstrate its
distinctness from any other known investigative procedure touched by the Fourth Amendment. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
19.
See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("Therefore, we conclude that the particular course
of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here--exposure of respondent's luggage,
which was located in a public place, to a trained canine--did not constitute a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." ). Ultimately the evidence seized from Place's
luggage was deemed inadmissible because of the ninety minute seizure. The canine sniff
search was immaterial to this holding. Id. at 710.
20.
United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1983). This case was reheard by the court specifically to decide its conformity to the Place decision. Reading Place
"in context of the entire decision," the court attached a specific importance to the initial
seizure being based on a "reasonable suspicion" before a sniff could be held to not implicate
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 593. The court, in reaching this decision, expressed fear of a
"dragnet" situation where an "indiscriminate use of roving trained dogs at airports" would
receive the Fourth Amendment's blessing. Id. at 595. This decision, however, was quickly
vacated by the Supreme Court, and a revised opinion consistent with Place was issued en
banc. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1984).
21.
757 U.S. 1359, 1367 (2nd Cir. 1985).
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the defendant's expectation of privacy, abhorrent of the Fourth Amendment. 22 The location of the sniff search, and relative expectation of privacy
in that location, seemed to be sliding its way into the cracks of the Place
decision.
High courts within the states also reached conclusions similar to those
in Thomas when a dwelling place was the location to be investigated. 23 In
situations away from the home, except where the expectation of privacy is
extremely low (like an airport), courts began to recognize a middle ground
requiring articulable suspicion before a sniff could take place.24 The most
common location this jurisprudence revealed itself, and this medium requirement established, concerned the use of a narcotics dog to sniff the exterior of an automobile.25 It is of some note, however, that in reaching their
conclusions, courts made reference to the potentially misleading way Justice O'Connor stated the issue in the Place opinion.2 6 By doing so the
courts seemed to be weaving a factual nexus between the justification for
the seizure, the location of the search, and the subsequent actions of the K9. Courts were classifying a sniff as a "search," contingent on the validity
of a stop and relative expectation of privacy in the location.27
22. Id.
23.
See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Neb. 1999) (requiring articulable
suspicion when conducting sniff search in the hallway of an apartment building).
24.
See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1989) (permitting sniff
search to a vehicle when supported by articulable suspicion); People v. May, 886 P.2d 280
(Colo. 1994) (requiring a government agent to have articulable suspicion to subject a package in the mail to a sniff search); Com. v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987) (deciding narcotics dog utilized to search an individualized storage locker requires articulable suspicion).
These middle grounds of privacy, even as acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court, have
always been evasive of specific standards and definitions when considered in the light of the
Fourth Amendment. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
Stone, 866 F.2d at 363; State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990).
25.
26.
Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98 ("The case presents the issue whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal
luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics." ). The First Circuit, in citing this statement, drew
from it the proposition that police officers were required to have a reasonable suspicion in
order to use the dog for a sniff test, making no reference to the later discussion and classification of a sniff search as sui generis. United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir.
1987). Quinn was subsequently followed by a district court, which stated "In [U.S. v.
Place,] the court applied the principles of Terry to canine sniffs of luggage and found that a
canine sniff of luggage is justified if supported by reasonable suspicion and properly limited
in scope." United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258, 264-65 (E.D. Va. 1992). This could
be in part the foundation for Illinois' reliance on Terry principles in Caballes discussed at
length below. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
27.
See Stone, 866 F.2d at 363 ("Likewise, we think police may employ a narcotics
dog to sniff an automobile which they have stopped upon reasonable suspicion to believe it
contains narcotics. Under these circumstances, police use of a narcotics dog is not a search
requiring a search warrant or probable cause.") (emphasis added).
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Most courts rejected this proposition and strictly applied the dicta in
Place to signify that a sniff could not be a search under the Fourth Amendment in any regard. The Ninth Circuit, after losing its battle to add an articulable suspicion standard, adopted this ideology.2 8 It was in good company: many federal courts, some in specific mention of Thomas, rejected
its logic and held that a sniff in a car, home, or otherwise, could never be a
search. 29 Nonetheless, because there was conflict in the courts concerning
the legal status of sniff searches, dog handlers were instructed by experts in
the field to proceed with caution in areas where a suspect might have a reasonable expectation of privacy.3 °
D. SUPREME COURT: CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND

The next Supreme Court case to discuss sniff searches arrived seventeen years later, in City of Indianapolisv. Edmond.31 This case considered
the validity of a police checkpoint where the primary purpose was the interdiction of narcotics.32 The court invalidated the use of such checkpoints,
holding that it would "not credit the 'general interest' in crime control as

justification for a regime of suspicionless stops.

'33

However, the sniff

searches at these checkpoints were not indicative of this result. The court
specifically reinforced the logic of Place, explaining that a narcotics dog
being present at a checkpoint would not "transform the seizure into a
search., 34 Once again, the court emphasized that a trained narcotics detection dog does not disclose anything but the presence or absence of narcotics. 35 In doing so, the court may have given its blessing to using canine

sniffs at any checkpoints founded upon a legitimate basis.36 It seemed, after
Edmond, that when the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to detect
drunk drivers and secure motorist safety, the use of a dog would not alter a
seizure, and any evidence gained as a result would be admissible.3 7
28.
United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 1985).
29.
See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993).
30.
SANDY BRYSON, POLICE DOG TAcrIcs 243 (Todd Bull ed,. McGraw-Hill Co.
1996) ("If the dog sniff takes place in an area where the defendant has a reasonabe expectation of privacy, such as his home or automobile, then the sniff does amount to a search and it
must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
31.
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
32.
Id.at 41.
33.
Id. at 41 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
34.
Id. at 40.
35.
Id.
36.
Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Comment, Constitutional Law: Ratifying Suspicionless
Canine Sniffs: Dog Days on the Highways, 57 FLA. L. REV. 963, 967-68 (2005).
37.
Prior to Edmond, the Supreme Court had approved the use of road blocks, or
suspicionless stops, to detect drunk drivers. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S
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E. LOWER COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS AFTER EDMOND

Facing the clarification Edmond offered, and in full recognition of the
disparate results courts had reached in its application, some jurisdictions
continued to enforce an articulable suspicion standard before a sniff search
could occur. 38 It may be that from its inception, the sui generis classification was tied to the standards applied by Terry.39 Courts read Place as a
whole, sometimes embracing, other times casting aside what they considered dicta. Because the standards of Terry were so pervasive in the reasoning of Place, courts built them into the requirements prerequisite to conducting a sniff search. 40 Other commentators have speculated that because
the officers in Place established a reasonable suspicion narcotics were present before the stop was effectuated, subsequent similar stops might require
the same level of suspicion.4 1 In any event, once these interpretations were
established courts were free to generalize within the bounds of Terry, gauging the lawfulness of a sniff search by weighing it against the suspect's
interest of privacy. 42
II. PEOPLE V. CABALLES
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Such was the temperament of the courts when a man by the name of
Roy Caballes drove down a stormy rural stretch of Interstate 80.
On November 12, 1998, at approximately 5:10 P.M., 43 traveling on a
stretch of Interstate 80 in La Salle County, Illinois, Roy Caballes was
stopped by State Trooper Daniel Gillette for traveling 71 miles per hour in a

444 (1990). Because the holding in Edmond was based on the impropriety of the seizure, it
would seem to follow that a sniff after a seizure for the detection of intoxicated drivers
would be lawful. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48.
See, e.g., State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002).
38.
See Place,462 U.S. at 706.
39.
[W]hen an officer's observations lead him to reasonably believe that a
traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of
Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage
briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.
Id. This passage served as an introduction to the eventual classification of sniff searches as
sui generis. Id. at 707.
See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 133, 135.
40.
Bekiares, supra note 36, at 970.
41.
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 134.
42.
United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *8, Illinois v. Caballes, 543
43.
U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923).
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65 mile per hour zone. 44 When Gillette radioed dispatch about the traffic
stop, Trooper Craig Graham (K-9 unit) stated his intent to meet Gillette and
conduct a canine sniff.45 Trooper Gillette did not personally request the K9 unit's assistance, nor did he speak directly to Trooper Graham. 46 Gillette
then informed Caballes of the speeding infraction, collected his license, and
requested he pull to the shoulder and walk back to the squad car.47 Caballes
complied and was informed he would receive a warning.48 Gillette then
checked for warrants, briefly questioned Caballes about his destination,
formal dress, arrest record, and whether or not he could conduct a search.49
Caballes reported no arrest record and denied the officers request to search
his vehicle. 50 Gillette discovered Caballes had two prior arrests for marijuana distribution and was in the process of writing a warning ticket when
Trooper Graham arrived and began walking the drug detection dog around
the car.5' The dog quickly alerted at the vehicle's trunk, which was then
searched, revealing a sizable amount of marijuana. 52 Caballes was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of drug trafficking.53
Caballes' motion to suppress the discovery of narcotics and quash the
arrest failed. 54 He was found guilty after a bench trial, fined $256,136, and
sentenced to 12 years in prison.5 ' The appellate court agreed with the holding of the trial court, affirming the conviction.56
The Supreme Court of Illinois took the appeal, and, relying primarily
on recent state precedent, reversed the conviction. 57 Focusing on the sec44.
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (II. 2003).
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. While obtaining Caballes' license and registration, trooper Gillette observed
"an atlas on the front seat, an open ashtray, the smell of air freshener, and two suits hanging
in the back seat without any other visible luggage." Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. The drug detection dog alerted in "less than a minute." Id.
53.
Id. The statute Caballes was charged under required 2,500 grams of marijuana
or more, approximately 5
pounds. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 550/5.1(a) (1997). Trooper
Gillette was kind enough to maintain his position regarding the speeding ticket. Mr. Caballes received a warning. Caballes,802 N.E.2d at 203.
54.
Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.
55.
Id.
56.
People v. Caballes, No. 3-99-0932, 797 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (opinion
not published according to rules of Illinois Supreme Court).
57.
In a previous decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a conviction expressing concerns that approving the use of a canine unit without "specific and articulable
facts" would lead to these sniff searches occurring "at every traffic stop." People v. Cox,
782 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 2002). Lack of specific and articulable facts was not the sole
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ond prong expressed in Terry v. Ohio, the court sought to determine
whether the sniff search was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. ' 8 The court
found the officer's observations of Caballes and his car were no more than
a "vague hunch," insufficient to justify the use of a narcotics detection dog,
thereby impermissibly expanding a traffic stop into a drug investigation. 9
The court then held that "specific and articulable facts" were required to
support the use of a canine sniff, reversed the decision of the trial court, and
held that the evidence would be suppressed. 6° The majority opinion made
no reference to either the Place or Edmond decisions. A dissent that focused on the implications of requiring Terry analysis before conducting a
sniff search and its incompatibility with the Edmond decision was also
entered.6 1
B. SUPREME COURT DECISION

Dissatisfied with the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, the State petitioned for certiorari in the following month.62 In January of 2005, Justice
Stevens issued the majority opinion of the Court, reversing the prior decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.6 3 The issue, as framed by the Court,
was "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a

reason for this reversal as the court held the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment due
to an unreasonable delay. Id. at 280.
58. See Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 204 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968)).
59.
Id at 205. A lack of visible luggage, the presence of an air freshener, and Caballes' nervous demeanor were insufficient for this court to find specific and articulable facts
evidencing the presence of narcotics. Id.
60.
Id. at 205.
61.
See Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
essentially makes the argument that a sniff is not a search. Further, classifying it as such
would expand Terry to include general searches for evidence normally requiring probable
cause to be accomplished with only specific and articulable facts. The dissent then concluded the decision would improperly diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of defendants
and be incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 207.
62.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 S.Ct. 405 (2005)
(No. 03-923).
63.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). Justice Stevens was joined in a 6-2
decision by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer. Souter and Ginsburg
both filed dissenting opinions. The late Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision. Id. at
405.
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legitimate traffic stop." 64 The Court proceeded with the assumption that no
suspicion existed at or during the stop before the sniff occurred.6 5
Justice Stevens began by granting approval to the primary source of
authority relied on by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Cox, holding
that if the rights of Caballes had been violated before the sniff occurred by
unreasonable delay, or otherwise, the sniff search and subsequent discovery
of narcotics would be invalid. 66 However, because the sniff was categorized by the lower court as the "cause rather than the consequence" of a
Fourth Amendment violation, it was out of sync with Supreme Court precedent.6 7 In order to be the cause of such a violation, the sniff would have to
be a search, which requires a legitimate interest in privacy to be compromised.68 Possession of narcotics being a privacy interest the Court was
unwilling to recognize, it held no reasonable interest existed. 69 In doing so,
the Court reiterated its holding in Place, stating that a sniff reveals only the
presence or absence of contraband, information unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. 70 The Court quickly dismissed the "false positive" issue, discussed at length infra, because the record contained no evidence of K-9
reliability,
and the trial court had found probable cause for the search to
71
exist.
The Court also distinguished its characterization of sniff searches from
its decision concerning thermal-imaging devices used to detect marijuana
growth lamps, Kyllo v. United States.72 Because the thermal-imaging devices used in Kyllo could reveal intimate details in a home (for instance, "at
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,")
in addition to detecting lamps used to grow cannabis, they compromised a
legitimate expectation of privacy and violated the Fourth Amendment.73 A
64.
Id. at 407 (citing to Pet. for Cert. i.).
65.
Id. The legitimate basis for the initial seizure itself was likewise assumed, as it
had never been contested. Id.
66. Id. The court felt the issue of unnecessary delay had been fully and fairly resolved by the trial court, although this point was not fully abandoned by the Respondent in
his attempt to avoid review by the Supreme Court. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 910, Caballes (No. 03-923).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Caballes, 543 U.S at 408-409 (citing U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)). Jacobson concerned a test utilized to affirm an officers' belief that a white powdery
substance was in fact cocaine. Because this test could reveal nothing but whether the substance was in fact cocaine, it did not violate any legitimate interest in privacy. Jacobson,
466 U.S. at 111-12, 123.
70.
Caballes,543 U.S. at 409.
71.
Id. The Court also explained that a false alert "in and of itself' reveals no private information, another factor in a sniff search avoiding Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id.
72.
Id. at 409-10 (citing and discussing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
73.
Id. at 410 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
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narcotics detection dog is dissimilar, once again, because it only reveals the
presence of a substance no individual has a right to possess.74
Accordingly, the sniff was held not to "rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement," and the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court was reversed.75
1. Dissent: Justice Souter
A dissent filed by Justice Souter zeroed in on the original classification
of a sniff search as sui generis in Place, arguing that narcotics detection
dogs disclose more than the "absence or presence" of contraband, often
disclosing the presence or absence of nothing at all. 76 The dog, Souter argued, is simply a reliable but imperfect tool granting probable cause to access an area that would reveal intimate details. For this reason, it should be
subjected to some kind of Fourth Amendment scrutiny to secure its reasonableness.77
Secondly, Justice Souter argued that without some connection between
the original basis for the stop and the subsequent police behavior as required by Terry, this decision would open the door for police to take unjust
advantage of a suspect's immobility.7 8
2. Dissent: Justice Ginsburg
The second dissent, filed by Justice Ginsburg, first noted that the Court
had often applied the Terry doctrine in situations where traffic stops had
occurred. 79 Agreeing with the Illinois Supreme Court's application of the
second prong of Terry, Ginsburg similarly
felt the sniff impermissibly ex, • 80
panded the scope of Caballes' seizure.
The opinion stated that by not
referencing this principle, the instant Court had implicitly denied its applicability. 81 In particular, Justice Ginsburg argued that by holding the intimidating nature of a police dog's presence and embarrassment caused by a
drug investigation did not broaden the scope of the seizure, the Fourth
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 409-10.
76.
See Caballes,543 U.S. at 411-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77.
Id. at 414 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78.
Id. at 415 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79.
Id. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80.
Id. at 420-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Discussing the proposition of Terry
principles being applied in traffic stop situations, Justice Ginsburg makes reference to
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). "A routine traffic stop ... is a relatively brief
encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop ... than to a formal arrest."'
Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
81.
Caballes,543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Amendment protections established by Terry were diluted. 2 The dissent
closed by expressing concerns about broad suspicionless sweeps of public
places, sidewalks, and parking lots without the consent of those being investigated.8 3
Both dissents hinted that, were the dogs sniffing for explosives, the re84
sulting opinion would have been issued 8 -0.
I. COMMENTARY ON CABALLES
A. IMPLICIT DENIAL OF TERRY

The first important consequence of Caballes is implicit, rather than
explicit, being the Court's choice to not discuss the rules of Terry in the
majority opinion. 85 The dissent and commentators in the months following
found this absence troubling.8 6 By not directly asking whether the sniff
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place," the Court may have abandoned its use of
Terry in a traffic stop scenario.8 7 This abandonment
88 departed from dicta
previously analogizing a traffic stop to a Terry stop.
However, on closer inspection, it seems the Supreme Court is gauging
the sniff search through the looking glass of Terry without explicit mention
of the case. While the Court did not use the magic words present in Terry,
it strongly suggested it would pass the test if applied. The Court, before
reiterating its holding in Place, stated: "[in our view, conducting a dog
sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its
inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner ....,89 It seems
to follow that, if the use of a drug detection dog could not change the character of a stop, it similarly could not alter its scope. Simply stated, the
Court is not abandoning the applicability of Terry to traffic stops; rather,
the Court is saying a dog does not alter the scope of a stop in violation of
82.
Id. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83.
Id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also suggested this opinion condones police circling cars with detection dogs at a red light. Id.
84.
Id. at 417 n.7, 424-25. The issue of dogs being used for detection of explosives
was initially raised by a conglomerate of law enforcement agencies filing a brief on behalf of
Illinois. Brief of Amici Curiae The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and The Major
Cities Chiefs Association in Support of Petitioner at 12-13, Caballes(No. 03-923).
85.
See Caballes,543 U.S. at 406-10.
86.
Id. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); See Robert Kalnitz, People v. Caballes:
Illinois Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Fails to Pass the Sniff Test, 17 DUPAGE COUNTY
B. Ass'N 8, 10-11 (2005). "The United States Supreme Court makes no mention of the lessons of Terry, deftly distancing itself from its own historical stance on the issue." Id. at 11.
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
Kalnitz, supra note 86, at 11.
88.
89.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
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Terry. One viable explanation for the Court's decision to omit Terry from
the opinion altogether is the confusion that was caused by its overwhelming
presence in Place.90 Courts reading Place "as a whole" had been applying
the balancing test of Terry, or analogizing the facts present in Place to draw
the conclusion that articulable reasonable suspicion was required in order
for a sniff search to be implemented. 9' That being the case, not incorporating the doctrines of Terry was likely a way to sever the two decisions once
and for all.92
B. A TIER TOO MANY - THE SUPREME COURT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO
COMPLICATE SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE

Another proposition fundamental in Terry the Court may have discomfort advancing is to further obscure Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
adding another tier of scrutiny to its already complicated equation.93 As
noted in the dissent of the Illinois Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court
generally requires probable cause, not articulable suspicion, to conduct anything classified as a search. 94 Were the Court to create a new tier of scrutiny, a "quasi-search," it would further complicate the interplay between the
police and the policed. This new tier would also have the potential of diminishing rights under the Fourth Amendment by allowing police to conduct some
types of searches without the usual requirement of probable
95
cause.
Alternatively, if this reluctance to establish a new tier of scrutiny results in the conclusions drawn by Caballes, the danger seems to squeeze in
the opposite direction. That is to say, if all minimally-intrusive police activities are to be either classified as a search requiring probable cause, or a
"non-event" in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment, the trend may be to classify activities as the latter, affording no protection at all.96
90.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
91.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
92.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
93.
See Oral Argument at 4, Caballes (No. 03-923) (Justice Souter acknowledging
the problems of creating a "quasi-search"). Other Supreme Court opinions have announced
discomfort with further complicating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "We are unwilling
to send police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of
uncertain description that is neither a 'plain view' inspection nor yet a 'full-blown search."'
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1987).
94.
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 207 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
95.
Id.
96.
The most common police activity achieving this non-event status is the "plain
sight" doctrine, allowing officers to shine flashlights or otherwise simply observe things laid
open to the public without facing Fourth Amendment scrutiny. E.g., Katz v. United States,
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The problems with this type of rigidity in the Fourth Amendment were
fundamental in the decision of Terry itself. "[By suggesting a rigid all-ornothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the
initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation. 9 7 The
Terry Court went on to allow for a brief search for weapons on less than
probable cause. 98 The Court made an exception to the usual probable cause
requirement here in light of the practicality and dangerousness of police
work. 99 It seems the Court is willing to complicate or relax the standards of
the Fourth Amendment where it advances the ability of a police officer to
protect his or her person. This possible one-sided outlook on the Fourth
Amendment is bolstered by case law allowing certain searches and seizures
in absence of probable cause.'00
In essence, there is something lost in predictability where standards are
subdivided, but the argument can be made that the peculiarities of a sniff
search demand a similar reaction in the court that Terry garnered. If a person's right to privacy is in fact "more sacred" than any other, perhaps the
complication of law enforcement procedure should yield to the civil rights
of an individual, where it has yielded to safety in the past.10 1
C. THE FALSE ALERT PROBLEM

A commonly voiced argument for this medium level of scrutiny has its
roots in a re-occurring criticism of the Caballes and Place decisions, the
problem of "false alert." The heart of this argument for those objecting to
the sui generis classification of drug detection dogs as a tool for discovering
narcotics lies in their unreliability. 10 2 Simply stated, a "false alert" occurs
when a dog trainer observes a sign from a detection dog that indicates the
presence of narcotics in the absence of a drug scent. 103 To further understand the reliability or unreliability of these animals, a brief discussion of
their training and the detection procedure will be helpful.

389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). Abandoned
materials are treated similarly. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
97.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
98.
Id. at 27-30.
99.
Id.
100.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (allowing a search of a
probationer's home without probable cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881 (1975) (allowing a seizure under reasonable suspicion to detect illegal immigrants).
101.

Union Pac.Ry. Co., 141 U.S. at 251.

102.
See Caballes,543 U.S. at 411-14 (Souter, J., dissenting); Bekiares, supra note
36, at 971-72.
103.
BRYSON, supra note 30, at 254.

2006]

PEOPLE V. CABALLES

1. Narcotics Dog Training
Possessing approximately twenty times the olfactory ability of a human being, all dogs are capable of smelling a narcotic. 1°4 Selecting a dog
with a proper disposition for the job involves a complex personality analysis, including, but not limited to, the dog's aggression, search drive, and
sociability.' °5 While canines typically require less time to train than their
handlers, a team will train for 320 to 400 hours before engaging in street
work. 1°6 The dog is trained by learning to retrieve a toy he or she has
grown fond of, saturated with the smell of any number of narcotics. 10 7
When the dog alerts correctly, it receives play or praise as reinforcement to
encourage similar behavior. ° 8 Before going on active duty, the K-9 team is
tested for accuracy.' °9 Some programs require perfection before graduation
occurs; others permit a single false alert.110 This graduation is not the end
of a dog's education. Much like a lawyer, continuing education, or reorientation, is a way of life for a competent narcotics detection team."'
Once on the beat, the procedure of detecting the presence or absence
of drugs in an automobile is relatively brief, typically ranging from one to
three minutes.' 2 In this time the officer walks around the car, paying specific attention to areas typically used to conceal narcotics, including the
flooring, roof liner, door jams, panels and consoles." 3 Throughout, the
officer closely monitors the dog, waiting for a behavior that would signify
the presence of contraband. 4 The use of dogs to detect narcotics is not an
exact science, although false alerts can often be attributed to the handler
rather than the dog." 5 Another possible source of a false alert is the detection of narcotics in similarly packaged materials." 6 If a dog is rewarded for
finding cocaine in plastic and duct taped packages several times, without
7
proper reorientation, it may begin to alert on the scent of that material. 1
104.
Id. at 53.
105.
Id. at 50-51.
106.
Id. at 252; Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the
NarcoticsDetection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 412 (1997).
107.
Bird, supra note 106, at 412. Dogs can be trained to detect cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine, but not LSD. BRYSON, supra note 30, at 252.
108.
BRYSON, supra note 30, at 255-56.
109.
Bird, supra note 106, at 413.
110.
ld at 413-14.
111. Id. at 421.
112.
BRYSON, supra note 30, at 273.
113.
Id.
114.
See id.
115.
Bird, supra note 106, at 425.
116.
See BRYSON, supra note 30, at 256.
117.
Id.
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2. The Failingsof FalseAlert Criticism
Because there is the possibility for false alerts, Justice Souter and other
commentators have protested its classification as sui generis under the
Fourth Amendment.11 8 They argue once the ability of a drug detection team
to find narcotics accurately and without flaw is discarded, their unique classification established by Place is unfounded. 19 To prove this lack of reliability, Justice Souter makes reference to narcotics dogs being approved
with less than impressive accuracy rates, and the difficulty of differentiating
between drugs and the drug residue on currency. 20
This argument can be rebutted and the sui generis classification defended with a slightly different reading of Place. The court, in establishing
the status of a sniff search, did not base its reasoning solely on the accuracy
of a narcotics detection dog, but equally emphasized its minimal intrusiveness. 12 1 The imperfection of a narcotics detection dog does nothing to alter
the sniff itself or the procedure's invasive character. The argument then
must be that a false alert will almost certainly lead to a full-blown search of
whatever is being investigated. If the location contains no contraband, this
is certainly a troubling invasion of privacy for no legitimate purpose.
However, the danger of conducting a search, and not discovering the
object sought, implicates a lack of probable cause rather than the sui
generis classification of a sniff search. Once the issue becomes the relative
lack or presence of probable cause, the critics concede a sniff is more than
enough to establish an evidentiary justification for a search. Justice Souter
does not "deny that a dog's reaction may provide reasonable suspicion, or
probable cause, to search the container or enclosure; the Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success to justify a search for evidence
or contraband."'' 22 Other critics acknowledge there is "little doubt" that a
23
properly conducted sniff search reveals only the presence of contraband. 1
Once it is conceded that probable cause is established by these sniffs,
the argument that their sui generis classification is inappropriate seems to
lose its footing. If a sniff is not intrusive, and generally reliable, there is no
substantive difference between a sniff search and the shine of a police offi118.
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412-13 (Souter, J., dissenting); Bekiares, supra note
36 at 971.
119.
Caballes,543 U.S. at 412-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
120.
Id. (citing United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (C.A.7 2001) (dog
falsely alerting up to 38% of the time accepted as reliable); United States v. $242,484.00,
351 F.3d 499, 511 (C.A. 11 2003) (as much as 80% of all currency contains drug residue)).
121.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707. "[T]he owner of the property is not subjected to the
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis." Id.
122.
Caballes,543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123.
Bekiares, supra note 36, at 972.

2006]

PEOPLE V. CABALLES

cer's flashlight. 2 4 An officer may just as often (or more often) mistake a
legal substance in plain sight for a narcotic. Nonetheless, an officer's eyes
seeking out the drug are not scrutinized under the Fourth Amendment.
The arguments unrelated to accuracy focus on the classification of a
sniff search as being "minimally intrusive," the second justification for narcotics dogs' sui generis classification. z5 These arguments include the
scope of probable cause resulting from the sniff search, the potential danger
or intimidation of the dogs, and arbitrary use. They will be discussed now,
in turn.
D. ARE NARCOTICS DETECTION DOGS MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE?

1. How Much Probable Cause? The CircuitSplit Concerning a Sniff
Search
Exacerbating the relative lack of Fourth Amendment scrutiny complained of above, courts are undecided how much of a vehicle an officer is
allowed to search based on an alert from a K-9 detection unit. The Fifth
Circuit addressed this issue in the decision United States v. Seals. z6
Mr. Seals was initially stopped for a broken tail light and arrested for
his inability to produce a valid driver's license. 27 Following the arrest and
Mr. Seals' removal from the scene, a K-9 conducted a sniff search around
his vehicle. 128 The K-9 did not alert initially, but jumped onto the driver's
side window of the car, interpreted by the accompanying officer as a positive alert to the passenger compartment. 29 Retrieving a glass pipe containing cocaine residue from an area between the front seats, the officer then
removed a piece of plywood from the back seat which allowed access to the
trunk, and there discovered 14 small bags of crack cocaine. 30 Because the
narcotics were discovered in a location the K-9 failed to alert, the court was
given an opportunity to discuss the implications of the alert by the driver's
side window. In doing so, the court stated, "[I]f officers have probable
cause to believe that contraband is in only one part of a car, then they are
limited to that area."' 131 The search of the trunk was eventually validated
because the discovery of the glass pipe with cocaine residue, the defendant's dishonesty, and a modified back seat provided probable cause to
124.
U.S. at 351.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Items left in plain sight receive no Fourth Amendment protection. Katz, 389
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
987 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107 n.8.
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search the rest of the vehicle. 32 However, had nothing been discovered in
the passenger side compartment, because the officers had no indication
from the K-9 that drugs were contained in the trunk, the subsequent search
revealing the crack
cocaine would likely have been nullified for lack of
133
probable cause.
The Tenth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the decision of Seals in the
case United States v. Rosborough.134 Strangely enough, Mr. Rosborough
was pulled over for the same infraction that justified the initial seizure of
Caballes, driving six miles per hour over the speed limit. 35 After finding
the driver's license to be valid, the officer issued a written warning and
gave Mr. Rosborough directions. 136 Immediately thereafter, Rosborough
consented to a search, and the officers began searching the interior of the
vehicle, discovering nothing. 37 Approximately thirty minutes later, a nar38
cotics dog arrived and alerted toward the front passenger area of the car.
After the alert, Rosborough revoked his consent to the search, the officers
revisited
the trunk and discovered approximately thirty pounds of co139
caine.
The court first acknowledged the Seals decision but was compelled to
decide differently because of prior precedent within the Tenth Circuit. 140 In
a previous case, United States v. Nielsen, the court invalidated the discovery
of cocaine in a motorist's trunk where the source of probable cause permitting the officer to search the passenger compartment was his smelling burnt
marijuana in the car.' 4' Because the search of the passenger compartment
revealed nothing, no corroboration of his suspicion regarding the presence
of marijuana existed. 42 Hence, the search of the trunk was conducted
without probable cause and declared invalid. 143 The court explained this
protection was necessary to prevent overzealous officers from vindicating
themselves by simply expanding the scope of a failed search.' 44 Before
closing, the court distinguished this scenario from one where the probable
cause was gained through the positive alert of a reliable drug sniffing
132.
Seals, 987 F.2d at 1107.
133.
See id.
134.
366 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2004).
135.
Id. at 1147; People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ill. 2003), vacated by 543
U.S 405 (2005).
136.
Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1147.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
139.
Id. at 1152.
140.
9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993).
141.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
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dog. 145 Because a dog would have no motive to make a false alert, the court
explained, no corroboration would be necessary to establish probable cause
to search the entire vehicle. 146
Relying on the dicta in Nielsen, the Tenth Circuit in Rosborough held
an alert toward the passenger area of a car establishes probable cause to
search the trunk as well.1 47 On closer inspection, an understanding of a
narcotics detection team (handler and K-9) reveals the logic of Nielsen and
the subsequent decision of Rosborough is deeply flawed. The court explains the difference between a human sniffer and a dog is the "incentive to
find evidence of illegal activities and to justify his actions when he had
searched."'148 What the court fails to recognize is the dominant role a human handler plays in the K-9 inspection process. 149 If a handler was to misread his dog, resulting in a false alert and a failure to discover contraband,
the handler would have just as much incentive to justify the initial search as
an officer who had smelled the narcotics himself. 5 ° This incentive is multiplied by the proposition that his ability to establish probable cause for
searches in court depends in part on the overall accuracy rate of the K-9
team. 15 1
This reality demonstrates the absence of a substantive difference between the unwarranted expansion of a search by a police officer with, or
without, the assistance of a canine. If courts are truly concerned about constitutional rights being endangered by overzealous law enforcement offi152
cers, it seems K-9 units should be similarly restrained to the area of alert.
Caballes did not present a means of resolving this circuit split because
the K-9 alerted in the precise area the narcotics were found. 153 But the purportedly expansive implications of Caballes lend more credence to those
who are nervous of dogs being used for broad sweeps of parking lots and
public roads. 54 If the consequence of a false alert is one specific area being
examined, presumably this intrusion on an innocent's privacy is much pre145.

146.
147.

Id.

Id.
Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1152-53.

148.
Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491.
149.
Bird, supra note 106, at 425. "Handlers interpret their dogs' signals, and the
handler alone makes the final decision whether a dog has detected narcotics." Id.
150.
As discussed above, handler error is almost always the cause for false alert. See
supra note 115 and accompanying text.
151.
See id.
152.
See Nielsen, 9 F.3d at 1491 (expressing concerns about an officer's motivation
in expanding a search).
153.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406. "The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert,
the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent." Id.
154.
Id. at. 422. "Today's decision . .. clears the way for suspicionless, dogaccompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots." Id.
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ferred to a dismantling of a vehicle he is traveling in or had parked along a
public road.
Ultimately, if a search predicated upon probable cause by a police officer is more restrained by the Fourth Amendment than an officer with K-9
assistance, the classification of a sniff search as more convenient and less
intrusive than other investigative measures starts to lose its luster. 155 For
that reason, the logic of Seals in the Fifth Circuit may provide a sufficient
protection of Fourth Amendment rights embraceable by those dissenting in
Caballes.
2. The Dangerand Intimidationof Narcotics DetectionDogs
The opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court have focused on the "limited
disclosure" of a narcotics detection dog but have given very little attention
to the presence of the dog itself. 156 The classification of K-9s as sui
generis, in part, rests on their convenient unintrusive nature. By implicitly
denying the applicability of Terry and its second prong, the court may have
closed the door on meritorious arguments about the intimidating and poten157
tially dangerous contribution a dog can inject into a standard traffic stop.
A dog has the capability of applying 1,200 pounds of force per square
inch when biting down, roughly the same force a car would apply when
striking an object.158 Occurrences of civilians being bitten as a result of a
sniff search are likely rare because of policies prohibiting the use of dogs to
search individuals or the packages that individuals are holding. 159 Even
with these safeguards in place, occasionally a person can be harmed. One
such occasion took place in a six-hour roadblock set up to check for valid
drivers' licenses; while checking, police conducted sniff searches. 160 During the course of operation, not only was there property damage to many of
the cars due to dogs alerting by scratch, but a person was actually bitten by
a police dog. 16 ' Away from the road, and into a schoolhouse, occasionally
students are subjected to these police dogs walking up and down the aisles
155.
As discussed earlier, the original classification of a sniff search as sui generis
argued a sniff is more convenient than simply "opening the luggage." See Place,462 U.S. at
707.
156.
Id.
157.
See Caballes,543 U.S. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158.
K. Sloman, Throw a Dog a Suspect: When Using Police Dogs Becomes an
Unreasonable Use of Force Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
191, 1 (2004).
159.
Bryson, supra note 30, at 43 (model K-9 policy prohibiting the use of narcotics
detection dogs for searches of individuals).
160.
Merrit v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11 th Cir. 1995).
161.
Id.
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of a classroom searching for drugs. 162 This practice could open the door to
a similar incident, making a child the victim.
Moreover, dogs have been sources of intimidation and violence
throughout this nation's history. 163 Beginning with tracking and intimidating slaves in the pre-civil war era and later utilized by law enforcement
during the civil rights movement to quell protestors, dogs have been a
strong source of intimidation. 164 Citizens have, in fact, been prosecuted and
convicted when the tables 6were
turned, and dogs were used to intimidate
5
law enforcement officials. 1
Given the animal's strength, reputation, and potential to cause harm, it
is difficult to make the argument that their presence does not alter the scope
of a routine traffic stop or intimidate the suspect in any regard. 166 This being the case, the Supreme Court may have failed to fully explore the consequences of implicitly denying the applicability of Terry to sniff searches,
stomping out valid arguments about the danger involved when narcotics
dogs are widely used. Describing the potential for 1,200 pounds of force
per square inch as "minimally intrusive" seems mildly disingenuous.
3. The Potentialfor Arbitrary Use of a NarcoticsDetection Dog
The final argument against the minimal intrusiveness of K-9s at a routine traffic stop is the lack of scrutiny leading to arbitrary use, resulting in
disproportionate implementation of sniff searches based on race. Discussion of this claim will be brief, as the implications and effects indiscriminate sniff searching could have on racial profiling provide grounds for an
entirely different paper.
As noted infra, the underlying thrust of the Fourth Amendment has
always been to protect against arbitrary invasions by government officials. 167 Generally, an officer's motivations for initiating a police stop
162.
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982).
Goose Creek Schools hired an independent contractor to conduct these sniff searches, perhaps demonstrating the potential for widespread use stretching beyond the capabilities of
trained police officers. Id. at 474.
163.
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Illinois as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19, Caballes (No. 03-923) (citing State v. Storm, 238
P.2d 1161, 1178-81 (Mont. 1951)).

164.

Id.

165.
Id. (citing United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222 (9th Cir. 1994) (intimidation of a
park ranger by canine); United States v. Caruana, 652 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1981) (intimidation
of an FBI agent serving subpoena)).
166.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "A drug-detection dog is
an intimidating animal." Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th
Cir. 2004) (McKay, J., dissenting) ("drug dogs are not lap dogs")).
167.
E.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) "The basic purpose
of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this court, is to safe-
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68
based on probable cause are immaterial to Fourth Amendment analysis.
This general principle holds one relevant exception. When dealing with
of laws, the Fourteenth Amendment
arbitrary and selective enforcement
169
prohibits race from being a factor.
The problems of discrimination through the use of narcotics dogs
manifest themselves in the following way: A traffic stop based on probable
cause is not subject to a "balancing" test, save some extraordinarily intrusive conduct by the police officer. 70 Probable cause, some suggest, is practically a given if based on the testimony of the police officer concerning a
traffic infraction. 7 Accepting this, alongside the almost endless list of
possible infractions, a police officer has a good deal of discretion in choosing who to stop. Classifying a sniff search as a non-event under the Fourth
Amendment, or a procedure that does not alter the stop in any regard requiring any level of suspicion, may grant police unlimited discretion in its use.
Without the requirement of articulable suspicion, if conducted within the
still existent durational limits, an officer needs no explanation for the use of
a drug detection unit.
Resulting is the opportunity for biased law enforcement officers to
utilize narcotics detection dogs more frequently on minorities than others.
The potential for false alert, resulting in a suspicionless search of an entire
vehicle, will then fall more heavily on minorities than others. Recent data
assembled for the detection of racial profiling has indicated minorities are
targeted by police officers more often than non-minorities. 72 Essentially,
Caballes could be problematic because any act performed by law enforcement without a requirement of justification holds the potential for abuse.

guard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." Id.
168.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
169.
Id.
170.
See Id.at 818.
171.
Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" From Start to Finish: Too Much
"Routine," Not Enough FourthAmendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843, 1847 (2004) (quoting
Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops-The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001))
[hereinafter LaFave].
172.
Statistics demonstrating and analyzing the presence of racial profiling are readily accessible online. Racial Profiling Data Collection Center at Northeastern University, at
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/index.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CABALLES
A. NO INCREASED USE OF CANINES TO SEIZE NARCOTICS

Having concluded the arguments related to the sui generis classification of a sniff search, discussing the likely implications of the Caballes
decision is appropriate.
There is no disputing that Caballes grants law enforcement greater
flexibility and discretion when using dogs for narcotics detection. Officers
noticing any number of slightly suspicious circumstances amounting to less
than articulable suspicion will be empowered to utilize a narcotics detection
dog. 173 Additionally, Caballes may open the door for suspicionless
searches of unoccupied cars in any number of public places, a proposition
troubling to its critics. 174 Assuming they can, a larger question concerning
the policy of law enforcement exists. Will Caballes spawn a wave of these
broad narcotics dog sweeps?
One concept, which affects all cultures, corporations and governmental entities, suggests it will not: scarcity. Law enforcement agencies are
constrained by the practical realities of the personnel and funds they are
granted. Because these broad sweeps are neither efficient nor cost effective, Caballesis unlikely to act as a catalyst for dogs roaming about parking
garages and public sidewalks.
1. Efficiency
The motive of law enforcement agencies working with narcotics detection dogs is to detect, seize, and destroy illegal narcotics. In order to
maximize the amount of narcotics seized, officers have an interest in accurately and frequently detecting contraband when sniff searches are conducted. Broad sweeps with dogs are unlikely because searching multiple
and numerous locations in a short amount of time has yielded poor to atrocious results.
One prime example is the roadblock sniff search sting described in
Merret v. Moore.175 In Merret, the Florida Department of Law Enforce173.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (2005). Officers are trained to inspect a vehicle for
various signs indicating the possibility of the presence of drugs. Some indicators officers
look for are an inability to roll windows down, high odometer mileage, attorney's cards,
radar detectors, and missing dashboard screws, among many others. Because the presence
of these factors may be entirely innocent, or indicative of the presence of drugs, the leeway
to employ a drug detection dog can aid in situations where less than articulable suspicion
exists. Brief of Amici Curiae The Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and The Major
Cities Chiefs Association in Support of Petitioner at 8, Caballes (No. 03-923).
174.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175.
58 F.3d 1547 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
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ment established two six-hour roadblocks on concurrent days, stopping and
sniff-searching every car that passed through. 176 Of the 1450 vehicles that
were sniff searched, the dogs alerted on twenty-eight, and only one person
was arrested for possession of narcotics. 177 Involved in this operation during the two days it spanned were sixty-four police officers, among them at
least sixteen K-9 units. 178 No statistics are available describing what these
sixteen K-9 units might have discovered had they pursued leads provided
by other officers or hunches, but certainly, they would have discovered
more than a traffic jam.
Another scenario demonstrating a poor ratio of positive alerts leading
to the discovery of narcotics is the scouring of high schools for contraband.
Students in an Indiana high school were restrained to their desks as four
narcotics detection dogs were walked through the aisles searching for
drugs. 179 In this two-and-a-half hour investigation, narcotics dogs alerted a
total of fifty times, discovering drugs on seventeen of those searched, an
unimpressive 34% success rate. 180 A similar regime of suspicionless sniff
searches in a Texas high school spanning8 a seven year period yielded thirty
searches, and uncovered zero narcotics.1 1
Even a highly trained and accurate narcotics detection team has a margin of error. Assuming a dog is correct 98 percent of the time, a broad
sweep of thousands will lead to more false alerts than searches actually
revealing narcotics.1 82 False alerts mean wasted time and effort for law
enforcement officers. This lack of efficiency provides a strong disincentive
for officers contemplating these types of broad, suspicionless searches,
which will make their frequency minimal.
2. Cost
The interest to maximize the efficiency of narcotics detection teams is
compounded by the cost of preparing them for work on the street. A dog
suitable for narcotics detection can cost a police department $7,000 to train
176.
Id. at 1459.
177.
Id. (sixty-one tickets for vehicle-related citations were also issued.).
178.
Id.
179.
Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1015-16 (N.D. Ind. 1979). These doghandler teams were accompanied by another officer, and at least one high school administrator. Students were allowed to use the restroom, if accompanied by another of the same sex.
Id. at 1017.
180.
Id. at 1017.
181.
Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857
(N.D. Tex. 2000). While the district court eventually reversed its holding in Gardner,this
case is cited purely for the facts as described. Gardner ex. rel. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. Civ.A.2:97-CV-020-J, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 32172310 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
182.
See Bird, supra note 106, at 427-28.
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or purchase pre-trained. I8 3 If the dog and handler are trained together, the
cost can rise above $14,000. 184 Equipment for operation including muzzles,
collars, and tracking equipment, can cost more than $1,500.185 Outfitting a
vehicle to accommodate a police animal requires over $2,000.' 86 Beyond
the costs of these operational necessities are those associated with the
common upkeep of any animal. Veterinarian's
bills, food, and the cost for
18 7
a kennel are approximately $1,500 annually.
The cost of training and equipment is heightened by the length of the
training itself. Sometimes reaching four months in duration, an officer that
could otherwise be performing regular police duties is costing a department,
rather than producing for it. 188 Assuming the median income provided by
the U.S. Department of Labor
is correct, another $10,000 in salary could be
89
spent during the training. 1
Because in the year a dog is trained a department could easily spend
over $30,000 making the narcotics detection team productive on the street,
one thing becomes clear: No department can afford to spend this amount of
money to produce the results described above. Broad, suspicionless sweeps
are the most prone to failure, wasting valuable time and money. 190 For this
reason, the investigation of cars along public streets or in garages feared by
Caballes' critics are unlikely to occur frequently, if at all.
B. CABALLES' POTENTIAL IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGY SEARCHES

The Caballes opinion also raises questions regarding the future treatment of new technologies under the Fourth Amendment. Quite simply, if a
technology was held to reveal only the "presence or absence" of contra91
band, it could similarly lie beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.'
183.
Janet Deltuflo, Drug Dog Activity Limited by Law, THE WICKENBURG SUN, Jun.
1, 2005, availableat http://www.oblivion.net/news (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
184.

JANEENA JAMISON WING, IDAHO CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, CANINE PROGRAM

189.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL

DRUG COST ANALYSIS 3 (2004).
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Bird, supra note 106, at 412.

OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, POLICE AND DErECTrVES (2004) (discussing median income of patrolman as $42,270 from the year 2002) available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl60.htm
(last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
190.
Bird, supra note 106, at 430.
191.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983)). This classification of sniff searches has been referred to as a "binary" search, or
one that simply yields a positive or negative result. The Supreme Court, 2004 TermLeading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REv. 179, 185 (2005) (citing United State v. Coyler 878 F.2d
469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

NORTHERN ILIJNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Two such technologies with the potential to achieve
this classification are
92
finding their way onto the law enforcement world. 1
The first of these technologies are hand-held X-Ray devices that allow
193
for law enforcement officers to remotely detect the presence of weapons.
While many different variations of X-Ray technology exist, for the purposes of this discussion only one aspect is relevant. 194 They allow for a
machine to detect the presence of a weapon from up to thirty feet away,
95
arguably disclosing nothing but the absence or presence of that weapon.
This technology
also carries the potential to reveal the presence of contra19 6
band.
The second, and perhaps more relevant to a discussion regarding the
detection of narcotics, are "trace detection" technologies which detect the
particles or vapors released by a drug in the air.' 97 This equipment has become so sophisticated that it is capable of detecting the presence of a single
nanogram of a narcotic. 98 When tested in a controlled environment, a
handheld version of this trace detection technology falsely alerted to parcels
5 percent of the time, but accurately alerted when cocaine was present at a
rate of 89 percent. 199 A single handheld 00unit with these capabilities would
cost a law enforcement agency $25,000.2
Prior to the issuing of the Caballes decision, the future of technology
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment was spearheaded by the similarly recent Kyllo v. United States.2 °' Specifically discussing trace technology, some thought Kyllo would almost certainly lead to suspicionless
192.
Other technologies similar to those discussed here could be affected by the
holding of Caballes, including enclosed-space detection systems. See Craig M. Bradley,
Court Sniffs at Dog-Search Concerns,41 TRIAL 62, 64 (2005).
193.
David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1996).
194.
See Id.
195.
Id. at 9, 32.
196.
Id. at 13.
197.
Robert F. Butler, Mailroom Scenario Evaluation,FinalReport 4 (March 2003),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/grants/199048.pdf.
198.
Id. at 8. For those as scientifically illiterate as I, imagine dividing a paperclip
into one million pieces, then dividing one of those pieces one thousand times again. What
remains would be a single nanogram. Needless to say, amounts due to contamination or
perhaps residue on a dollar bill could be detected, but the threshold "alert" level can be adjusted. Id. at 9, 21.
199.
Id. at 12, 21. The machines accuracy detecting marijuana were notably worse,
correctly detecting its presence only 18 percent of the time. Id. at 21. This level of performance is notably more reliable than some narcotics detection teams approved by courts. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200.
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MAILROOMS 2 (Nov. 2004), availableat http://nicic.org/library/020073 [hereinafter PRISON
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533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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searches with these devices being stricken down.2 °2 Because Kyllo paid
specific attention to whether the technology being used was in "general
public use," some thought it could lead to a blanket ban on 20the
3 use of trace
technology without some level of suspicion as justification.
However, the Caballes opinion distinguished itself from Kyllo by
claiming that the critical fact in Kyllo was the technology's capability of
revealing lawful activity that would otherwise be undisclosed.2 4 The heat
sensor technology used in Kyllo did not simply disclose the absence or
presence of contraband, but disclosed other protected information of legal
activities in a home. 20 5 A trace technology search would reveal no such
details, but simply the absence or presence of an illegal chemical compound
in the air. Similarly, an X-Ray unit would reveal only the absence or presence of a gun-sized piece of metal. 206 The distinction between a sniffsearch
narcotics dog and a thermal imaging device used in Kyllo seems to be absent when discussing the trace detection or X-Ray technologies being currently developed and utilized.
Faced with this powerful analogy tying trace detection and other technologies to sniff searches, courts may find their use does not constitute a
search in any regard, removing them from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
This possible result is reinforced by the relative lack of invasive characteristics, albeit ignored by the Caballes court, raised by the presence of a narcotics detection dog.20 7 While a trained canine carries the potential to bite
or otherwise intimidate a suspect, a hand-held electronic device does not.208
Furthermore, any contention raised in the circuit split discussed supra regarding the scope of probable cause is nullified, because a machine certainly lends no illegitimate motivation to overzealously search following a
false alert. 2 9 This will almost certainly mean such a device will grant law
210
enforcement great leeway in the extent of the search following an alert.
If trace technology searches were classified as non-Fourth Amendment
events, the results could more closely resemble those feared by critics of
202.
Heather K. McShain, Not Quite Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451: The Uncertain
Future of Sense-Enhancing Technology in the Aftermath of United States v. Kyllo, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2002).
203.
See id. at 47-48. It is worthy of noting this article discussed the invalidation of a
trace technology search when used to detect narcotics in a home, another possible source of
protection the court could use to invalidate a search. Id.
204.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
205.
Id.
206.
David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1996).
207.
See Caballes,543 U.S. at 407-10.
208.
See supra Part III.D.2.
209.
See supra Part III.D. 1.
210.
Id.
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Caballes. Among those troubling scenarios are broad suspicionless sweeps
of parked cars and parking lots. 211 A machine would more likely result in
these envisioned searches, because the practical limitations of broad
searches with dogs are weakened in the wake of a machine. First, the cost
of a hand-held trace detection device is $5,000 less than the expense of
training and maintaining a healthy narcotics detection dog.2 12 Secondly,
and more importantly, narcotics dogs perform poorly when exposed to vast
quantities of potentially contaminated targets, a strong disincentive for officers attempting to maximize their efficiency. 21 3 Almost certainly a machine
would perform consistently, regardless of the targeted quantity.
Trace technology is capable of detecting only the absence or presence
of contraband. It is also less intrusive and more efficient than canine units.
These realities demonstrate the high likelihood of this technology being
used legally for random detection of narcotics in the future.
CONCLUSION

The Caballes decision solidified the sui generis classification of sniff
searches, allowing the utilization of narcotics detection dogs absent any
level of suspicion, without any further explanation for their special treatment. While it may have simplified varied state and federal precedent,
genuine concerns remain pertaining to the accuracy and minimal intrusiveness of these animals as used by law enforcement. These concerns include
the extent of a search allowed following an alert, their potential danger, and
arbitrary use. While Caballes may not lead to droves of canines in parking
lots, without further explanation the sui generis classification of these dogs
may envelop new and advancing technologies similarly exempting them
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. If trace technology becomes the radar
detector of the twenty-first century, the absence or presence of a more detailed explanation for a Fourth Amendment free pass will become increasingly relevant.
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